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Brietzke: Dworkin Today

REVIEWS
DWORKIN TODAY
PAUL H. BRIETZKE*

Law's Empire, by Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1986. Pp. x + 413, $20.00.
This excellent book would have been better titled The Empire Strikes
Back. Admittedly, Professor Dworkin gives topographical and metes-andbounds descriptions of the Empire. But these are subordinate to the Emperor's efforts to unhorse his enemies, by edict. (I mean no disrespect to the
preeminent legal philosopher, English-speaking, of our time.) Jurisprudence, the capital of Law's Empire, the Jewel in the Crown, has been under
unremitting academic attack for a decade. Law and Economics entered the
field from the Right and Critical Legal Studies from the Left,' capturing
Chicago and Harvard castles respectively (please turn your map upside
down) - law schools where even the architecture announces an intention to
repel invaders. In the middle and under the threat of being cut off from
mainstream legal analysis, jurisprudence initially responded with tepid defenses of tradition and moderation. Having had the field too long to itself,
jurisprudence had become rather loose in argument, stale, inward-looking,
and lacking in the spit-and-polish of a concrete methodology. Professor
Dworkin's muscular attempt to rally the jurisprudential troops, rag-tag
groups marching to many different drummers, succeeds at the level of tactics. His strategy is perhaps open to question: he attempts to co-opt the
insurgent barbarians by showing them how they are really "just like us."
The outcome of his efforts may be licentiousness around campfires built in
the Forum of the law. Lacking the hindsight and wit of Gibbon, I will de*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.

I. See R. DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 96 (1986) [hereinafter EMPIRE] (examining the
"flesh and battledress" of jurisprudential theories); id. at 407 (quoted infra note 64); R.
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 4 (1985) [hereinafter PRINCIPLE] (economics "has colonized a large part of American legal education and placed ambassadors in Britain and elsewhere."); Clark, Philosophies at War in Law Schools, INSIGHT, Sept. 29, 1986, at 52. ("New
tribes are camped on the borders of the legal profession."); Reidinger, Civil War in the Ivy,
A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 64.
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part from my strained metaphor to describe and tentatively criticize2 Dworkin's ideas as matters of strategy and tactics. I will draw upon Dworkin's A
Matter of Principle (1985) and Taking Rights Seriously (1977) where

they make the same points more clearly and/or in greater detail.
TACTICS

Dworkin is not one of those rare legal philosophers with a great deal of

respect for philosophies other than their own. Law's Empire thus begins by
showing jurisprudes why their more fissiparous beliefs are wrong and even
heretical. Through sheer brilliance, this demonstration succeeds better than
might be expected as a means to rally the troops. He lumps legal philoso-

phies into two categories for purposes of brief criticisms. Legal positivism,
legal realism, and natural law are termed "semantic" theories; convention-

alism and pragmatism, along with the "integrity" Dworkin now espouses,
become "interpretive" theories of law. This gross distinction is difficult to
sustain because, among other things, interpretive legal analysis usually involves a great deal of semantic manipulation.3 Conventionalism inevitably

shades over into legal positivism, pragmatism becomes legal realism in the
1920s and 1930s, and Dworkin's integrity theory frequently appears as a

4
species of natural law, perhaps with a minimum content.

2. It is said that if you shoot at the king you must kill him, but I have neither the desire
nor the ability to do Professor Dworkin an injury. Improved legal analysis, rather than a gratified ego, should be the aim of all who care for the law, including those who would reject the
Imperial dimensions Dworkin ascribes to it. Lacking a strong background in philosophy, I will
nevertheless cite some sources that cast doubt on some of Dworkin's arguments. His arguments
may be valid alternatives to those I cite; I cannot be certain. Although Ken Klein provided
helpful comments on a draft of this Review, errors remain my responsibility.
3. Semantic theories of law are those grounded in the philosophers' insistence on following certain linguistic criteria (which are often hidden) for applying legal propositions. EMPIRE,
supra note 1, at 31-32. But these criteria are frequently manipulated for political purposes
when, for example, British judges interpret statutes. See PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 14, 30.
This confirms the expectations of empiricists like Mill, who see analytical statements as based
on the artful manipulation of language - a process which seems to account for some of the
force in Dworkin's arguments. See SCHMIr, Phenomenology, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 135, 136 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967).
4. Natural law criteria are not merely factual but moral, at least in part. EMPIRE, supra
note i, at 35. Through the kind of integrity Dworkin observes in legislating, judging, and much
of our political practice, he aims at a morally coherent set of laws. Id. at 176, 243, 262-63; see
id., passim. This can be termed a "morality of aspiration" not always realized, the minimum
content of an "internal morality of law." See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 184-86
(1969); infra text accompanying note 17. See also R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 501-02 (5th ed.,
1985). But it "is not a very important objection" to call integrity a version of natural law.
EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 263.
Apart from integrity and perhaps conventionalism, the terms Dworkin uses to describe
legal philosophies will be familiar to readers with an interest in jurisprudence. Under conventionalism, past decisions are sources of rights and responsibilities only to the extent that these
can be made explicit by methods conventionally accepted by the entire legal profession. Where
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Law-as-integrity derives from Dworkin's aesthetic perspective on the
legal system, in what seems to be the first significant influence aesthetics
exerts on modern legal philosophy. Many of us have been struck by the
beauty, ugliness, or consummatory quality of a rule or chain of precedent,
and Dworkin offers a means to formalize our impressions. Integrity is the
"illuminating fit" between a rule and our legal and political practice.5 As in
literary criticism, interpretations of law and the means of developing them
may be controversial. Yet the critics are joined in a constructive pursuit of
understanding. They impose "purpose on an object or practice. . . to make
of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to
belong." 6 Deconstructive critics of law or literature would disagree strongly,

but Dworkin treats this as their problem rather than his.
Making an Elizabethan property case relevant to a current American
dispute is akin to presenting a meaningful "Merchant of Venice" to a contemporary audience. The judge, an author as well as a critic and a student
of contemporary culture, behaves like a writer adding a subsequent chapter
to a chain novel written by several people. Interpretations of plot and character, etc., must be discarded by the writer where they fit poorly with the
preexisting material; formal and structural considerations, and accidents of

circumstance, will win out over fresh insight, realism, and beauty. Dworkin
does well to perch his judge halfway between a total creative freedom and
the mechanical textual constraint of, for example, a mere discovery of a

previous author's intent. But Dworkin may not be justified in assuming that
no applicable convention exists, judges have discretion to fashion a new convention from extralegal sources. Id. at 95, 117.
EMPIRE continues the argument against positivism that Dworkin began in R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). EMPIRE, supra note I, at viii. But see also infra notes 44,
46-48 and accompanying text. For Dworkin's positivists, law consists of historical decisions by
those in political power. This purely descriptive approach breaks down in "hard" cases because
positivists are interested merely in "different" answers, rather than in the "right answers"
Dworkin seeks. EMPIRE, supra note 1,at viii, 34; PRINCIPLE, supra note 1,at 147. Dworkin's
treatment of jurisprudential theories is also discussed infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. EMPIRE, supra note 1.at 411. Dworkin suggests at one point that integrity requires
the best story to be told from the standpoint of political morality, rather than of aesthetics. Id.
at 239. PRINCIPLE nevertheless demonstrates the debt Dworkin's integrity concept owes to aesthetics. PRINCIPLE, supra note I,at 146-66, Chapter 6, entitled "How Law is Like Literature"
contains "The Aesthetic Hypothesis," Id. at 149-54. This Hypothesis describes what critics
disagree about: Which way of reading a text makes it the best work of art? Arguments here
are to be evaluated in terms of their explanatory and critical power (rather than in terms of
political morality). Id. at 149, 154.
6. EMPIRE, supra note i, at 52. See id. at 16-17, 49-50, 248, 250. Legal theories are
termed constructive interpretations which seek "equilibrium between legal practice ...
and
the best justification of that practice." Id. at 90. The best statutory interpretation is that which
creates the best "performance of the legislative function." Id. at 353. Dworkin's aesthetic purpose seems to be that of a "constructive metaphysics" giving us "the great visions of philosophy." But positivists would argue that there are no verification or confirmation procedures for
testing his conclusions. See V. ALDRICH, PHILOSOPHY OF ART 90-91 (1963).
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the material for a judicial chain novel resembles Charles Dickens' A Christ-

mas CaroP rather than, say, William Burroughs' disordered and disorienting Naked Lunch.'

There may be other weaknesses in Dworkin's approach, such as an arguably inappropriate "tone." Just as critics may ascribe more weighty

socio-economic commentary to Raymond Chandler than this detective novelist can comfortably bear," so too may Dworkin's philosophical "high
style" lend too much dignity to artifacts of a political rough-and-tumble.
He may, in other words, wind up taking rights too seriously, out of a love of

art for art's sake. 0 Having made rights sacrosanct, Dworkin does not tell us
how to compromise them sensibly when they inevitably come into conflict

with each other.
Law may be less like a Dworkinian chain novel than a working within
an artistic or craft tradition, especially under contemporary, looser notions
of precedent and statutory interpretation. We often cannot say that the
judge-as-artist has made his "canvas" the best it can be, either because the

canvas starts out so blank that it can become literally anything, or because
it has been painted over so frequently that any new rendering will seem a
EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 229, 231-34, 237; PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 149. See
supra note 1, at 56.
8. W. BURROUGHS, NAKED LUNCH (1959). LUNCH is a convenient example of disorienting material presented in a disordered but nevertheless effective way, under the "fold out,
fold in" technique pioneered by Burroughs. Burger Court opinions in some areas of the law
perhaps read like chain novels adopting Burroughs' technique. For Dworkin, skepticism
predicts the result many see as flowing from these opinions: entropy leading to a legal chaos.
This result can be avoided by applying energy, imagination, and foresight but these qualities
were arguably in short supply on the Burger Court. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 407.
9. But see PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 151.
10. Dworkin apparently seeks to perfect the formal beauty of his system, regardless of
what society expects and of rival aesthetic theories. These would include realism, a related
need to base one's system on empirical and experimental results, Marxism, and American
naturalism-the continuity of art with the rest of life and culture. Dworkin does display a
broad sense of social responsibility and some sensitivity to the symbolism of law, but his emphasis on a "phenomenology" of adjudication gives the impression of a legal system rather too
independent of its creators and perceivers. Like art, law is expressive of human feelings. See
BEARDSLEY, History of Aesthetics, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 18, 30-33 (1967); HosPERS, Problems of Aesthetics, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 35, 46-50 (1967); infra note
61 and accompanying text (Dworkin's assertion that law makes us what we are).
Real judges decide cases more instinctively than Dworkin's judge; his announced need to
relate everything to a general theory would cause paralysis and clog dockets. This may be the
objection of a "minor critic," as Dworkin argues, but I fear that Dworkin's judge occasionally
has to re-invent the wheel in order to change a tire. See EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 264-65.
Dworkin does admit that theories of art do not exist in isolation from philosophy, sociology,
and cosmology, and that the best of criticism denies that literature has but one function. PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 151-52. As to whether these insights are fully carried over into his legal
analyses, see infra note 39 and accompanying text and infra text following note 65.
7.

EMPIRE,
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whitewash or a vulgar pastiche." The materials and media of law and art
sometimes seem to have their own powers of expression, independent of
their manipulators. In art, and in law if we are honest, many critics excessively praise the merely sensuous, or a mere breakout from tradition, or a
subtle lampoon of that tradition.
These quibbles aside, Dworkin's law-as-integrity succeeds admirably as
a pioneering aesthetics of law. Description, interpretation, and evaluation
are blended together in "conversations" about art and law. Diverse legal
elements are put in balance and skillfully added up to suggest an overall
unity. Many of the seams where Dworkin has stitched this unity together
remain clearly visible. Yet the reader also sees how that which is unique, in
four representative works of the "hard" case genre, contributes to that
which is universally significant in Anglo-American (only) law. Dworkin
stresses that, like the aesthete, a judge faces the difficult struggle to attain
detachment and disinterestedness. These attainments are not always displayed by Dworkin himself - personal preferences perhaps intrude in his
analyses more often than is strictly necessary - but he at least does the
reader the favor of making these preferences explicit. 2
In good philosophical fashion, Dworkin's theory of integrity puts a premium on coherence for its own sake. His judge'3 does not stop after discovering the applicable legal conventions or the rule that is best for our future
on pragmatic grounds. Integrity forces a judge to go further and establish a
broad consistency among contemporary principles, rather than among policies. Dworkin does not feel the need for consistency among principles over
time, since he seeks to discover order in legal doctrine rather than in the
forces creating it.' 4 Fair enough, but he should recognize and somehow acIi. See EMPIRE, supra note I, at 111 and infra note 12. But see infra note 65.
12. See V. ALDRICH, supra note 6, at 4, 88; HOSPERS, supra note 10, at 36, 43. Dworkin
notes that we "find it very difficult to achieve the distance from our own convictions necessary
to examine these systematically as a whole. We can only inspect and reform our settled views
" EMPIRE, supra note !, at I 11.
the way sailors repair a boat at sea one plank at a time ..
Also, "detail is more illuminating than range" in jurisprudence. Id. at 397. For an example of
what is arguably the intrusion of personal preferences into Dworkin's analysis, see EMPIRE, at
297-98, 301-09, 403-04, 407-08 (equality of resources as a canon of justice).
13. Dworkin frequently calls his judge Hercules, and less frequently Hermes (the interpreter of statutes) or Siegfried (a judge in a disdained, Nazi-style legal system). See id. at
105, 239, 248, 313, 317, 354, 380, 394, 399, passim. Dworkin first introduced his readers to
Hercules in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4, at 105-30. There, Hercules easily
demonstrated his intellectual superiority over a dumb judge rather tastelessly named Herbert,
presumably after H.L.A. Hart. See id. at 125-30. It is difficult to see why so Nietzschean a
"superjudge" as Hercules is not beyond so mundane a matter as the law-beyond, indeed,
good and evil. We can perhaps take comfort from the thought that Hercules is, after all, only
Dworkin in disguise.
14. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 167, 220-22, 226-27, 273. Historical consistency of legal
principles is essential to, among other things, give fair warning of what the law requires in the
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count for the fact that these historical forces operate as accidental, conceptual, and institutional constraints on achieving a doctrinal order. History
may, in other words, create more anomalies than even Dworkin can sweep
away.
He should also realize that many have trouble making the clearcut
distinction between legal principles and policies that he first stressed in
Taking Rights Seriously.1" In most legal theories, and certainly in legal
practice, principles are not invariably more important than policies and an
efficiency-enhancing consistency among policies. At least on occasion,
courts use newly-discovered policies to override moral principles deeply embedded in the case law: environmental and child labor laws, for example,
overrode established property rights and the related freedom to conduct
your business as you see fit. Such policies may be less or more attractive
than the rights they displace, but the political will to implement them cannot be negated simply by terming it unprincipled and incoherent.
For Dworkin, integrity does not enforce itself. Judgment is required
over the "contested convictions" of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process. These convictions must be melded into an overall opinion "sensitive
to the great complexity of political virtues," popular convictions, and national traditions.1 6 Different judges will strike different balances of conviction and erect different thresholds beyond which personal preferences will
not influence case outcomes. The functions of integrity are rather modest
here: identifying the "branching points" of legal argument, the points at
which judges' opinions will diverge; showing how to avoid "checkerboard"
solutions that justify the part by endorsing principles which must be rejected to justify the rest; and forcing judges to face candidly their responsibility to make principled new law when the old law runs out. 17 Integrity

seems so loose a constraint at this level that it is hard to see how, as Dworpresent - an important aspect of justice. See id. at 141, 248.
15. See supra note 4, at 22-28, 90-100. Policy questions are those where no principles or
rights are involved, and court decisions are thus to be governed by the will of the people.
EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 341. See id. at 339-40 (discussion of Endangered Species Act policies). Yet the Constitution as currently interpreted does not seem to recognize all of Dworkin's
principles, and constitutional rights are narrower and otherwise differ from those Dworkin
discusses. He argues that legislation invites the policy judgments that adjudication does not;
preexisting rights and duties consistently constrain judges' policies, under the canons of integrity. Id. at 244, 410. Pragmatists, legal realists, economists, and the growing numbers of
judges conscious of their policymaking function would dispute this statement. The relevant
issues are not merely those raised by an "activist" judge substituting his judgment for the
legislature's in matters of policy as well as principle. But see id. at 398.
16. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 398. See id. at 410, 412; infra note 23 and accompanying

text.
17. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 132, 134, 184, 412. See id. at 248, 250, 255. Dworkin
presumably knows that it will not always be politically feasible for courts to make new law,
candidly or otherwise.
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kin maintains, the application of integrity will consistently generate the
"right" answer. Dworkin admits that the answer cannot be proved right to
the satisfaction of all, 8 but this leaves unanswered the question of how
many people must be satisfied. The high level of consensus Dworkin seeks 9
suggests that nearly everyone must be satisfied with the rightness of
answers.
Law-as-integrity comes into its own in constitutional adjudication, the
locus of many "hard" cases. The abstractions of Dworkin's integrity blend
well with "notoriously abstract" constitutional provisions and the no less
abstract convictions of the Framers. This blend accounts for case outcomes
much better than do the "famously elusive" distinctions drawn in American
constitutional theory, distinctions which are usefully reviewed by
Dworkin.20
The Constitution itself is found to contain some checkerboard solutions: slavery was a massive violation of principles used to justify other
parts of the Constitution and, at the other end of the spectrum, tort laws
are permitted to vary from state to state - a possible violation of Equal
Protection. Integrity can nevertheless be used to generate interpretations
that both match the Framers' state of mind and permit a principled community to change its constitutional purposes. Partly by inference, Dworkin
shows how currently-popular theories of constitutional "original intent" are
lacking in integrity, as that word is commonly used and as Dworkin uses it.
He seems to fall only a bit short of a full theory of constitutional enforcement (remedies) that fits and justifies the power the Constitution gives
courts. 1 The vagueness of this power means that no theory of enforcement
18.

Id. at ix. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 31-33, 52-56 and accompanying text.
20. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 355, 357-59, 364-65. See generally id. at 355-99. See also
infra note 65. There is no evidence of a constitutional meta-intent - that the Framers intended their attitudes to be decisive in the future - and no reason to forever adhere to the
intent of so unrepresentative a group. EMPIRE, at 364. The "famously elusive" distinctions of
constitutional theory surveyed include: conservative/liberal, interpretivist/noninterpretivist,
and passivism/activism (a "virulent" legal pragmatism). Id. at 358-59, 368-73, 378. Integrity
papers over these distinctions with the fine-grained, discriminating, case-by-case approach that
gives place to many political judgments but tyranny to none. See id. at 378; infra note 21.
21. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 184-86, 360, 364-65. See id. at 390-91. One facet of this
theory is the treating of like cases alike while acting on a single, coherent set of principles, so
as to promote the community's moral authority to a monopoly of coercion (legitimacy). See id.
at 141, 188; infra note 55 and accompanying text. An example may illustrate a potential
weakness in Dworkin's approach: his analysis of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 486
(1954) in EMPIRE, at 362. For Dworkin, the dominant conviction of the Congress passing the
Civil War Amendments was suitably abstract - the law should treat all citizens as equals even if some Congressmen then thought that school segregation did not violate this principle.
Id. A cynic (and not me, in any event) might argue for a different conviction: Congress wished
to register in legal form the fact of who had won the Civil War. This "carpetbagger" sentiment would have to be phrased as an abstraction, so as to not antagonize unduly those who
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can be placed beyond dispute.
Philosophy is a linguistic art, and Dworkin attempts an aesthetic use of
this art form to describe what he sees as another art form: law. The danger
is one of being too "arty," of allowing aesthetics to refer chiefly to itself
rather than to the subject matter under investigation. In the visual arts,
such self-reference can occur when values like color, line, shape, mass, and
balance are the primary means for evaluating a work. Similarly, legal theory often refers chiefly to itself when law-as-integrity pursues the mediumistic values of justice, fairness, and procedural due process. 2 Political philosophers and other non-lawyers do not ignore these values, of course, but
those values play a much smaller role in everyday discourse and political
practice than Dworkin's theory would have us believe. This is also true of
legal consistency for its own sake, which is too Germanic a value to have
much influence in a rather pragmatic nation seeking something that works,
rather than philosophic salvation.
Dworkin is unclear as to how his integrity-based values link up: "integrity of process" (presumably including fairness as well as due process values) is said to provide a check on "substantive integrity," the primary goal
would find it inelegant or otherwise distasteful. If this were the dominant conviction, canons of
integrity would prompt a judge to ask: Would school desegregation make the Civil War victory
the best it can be? The answer might be desegregation for the South - to dismantle institutions and indirectly a culture perpetuating attitudes inconsistent with that victory - and, as
has sometimes been argued, no desegregation in the North. If such a conclusion follows the
rules of logic, it suggests that the wrong answer can flow from applications of integrity, particularly where the law attempts a checkerboard solution (the Civil War Amendments) to a
checkerboard problem (slavery). Such situations are more common than Dworkin seems to
assume.
22. See id. at 243, which states:
Law as integrity asks a judge to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is
structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due
process, and it asks them to enforce these . . . so that each person's situation is fair and
just according to the same standards. That style of adjudication respects the ambition
• . . to be a community of principle.
See also id. at 166-67; HOSPERS , supra note 10, at 46.
Justice concerns the right outcome in distributions of resources and opportunities. Fairness amounts to the right political structure, where each person exerts more or less equal
influence and a legislative supremacy protects the majority's right to make law. Procedural due
process adds up to the right procedures, in an equitable enforcement process that (as law and
economics creeps in) strikes a balance between accuracy and efficiency. Included are a strict
view of precedent, deference to legislative history, and allowing local preferences to take priority wherever possible. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 164, 166-67, 403-05, 411. An example of the
mediumistic nature of due process is the extreme view that whatever happens under fair procedures is just. See id. at 177. This is something most citizens and politicians who are, e.g.,
watching "criminals" go free on procedural "technicalities" would never accept. Some legalistic minds find it quite plausible, however. Dworkin's value system can operate as he intends
only if there is a consensus over the rightness of outcomes, structures, and procedures. This is a
rather unlikely eventuality. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss2/4

Brietzke: Dworkin Today

19871

DWORKIN TODAY

called justice. Justice is defined as equality in the distribution of resources,
so liberty is presumably relegated to the subordinate, constraining role described by "integrity of process." Perennial conflicts between liberty and
equality cannot be dealt with evenhandedly and resolved to the satisfaction
of conservatives when liberty is given a subordinate role; equality is more
likely to win out over liberty under Dworkin's scheme, which runs counter
2
to the usual outcome in the United States. But there may be no way to resolve the liberty/equality dilemma to the
satisfaction of all or even most, and Dworkin obviously cannot solve all of
the problems of political and legal philosophy in any one book. Law's Empire should serve to increase the sense of harmony among jurisprudes on
many topics. Many of Dworkin's arguments are compelling, and they seemingly grant concessions to dissidents by incorporating more from the rival
theories of conventionalism, natural law, and pragmatism than Dworkin lets
on.2 4 He also admits that the "off duty" philosopher will likely argue mat23. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 403. See id. at 188, 310; id. at 222-23 ("most working
political theories" recognize "individual rights as trumps over . . . policy" concerning the
equalization of wealth); id. at 297-98 (rejecting libertarian or "natural" and welfare-maximizing definitions of property rights, in a preemptory fashion); supra note 22; infra notes 46, 59
and accompanying text.
Dworkin does admit that due process, fairness, and justice sometimes conflict with each
other and with integrity, particularly when the majority's interests conflict with those of a
minority. EMPIRE, at 178, 188, 218-19. See id. at 218 (products liability laws can violate integrity); id. at 341 (an example arising under the Endangered Species Act, where Dworkin argua-bly defines away the conflict between environmentalists and pro-growth advocates). Libertarians and egalitarians nevertheless share a sense of the rough boundaries of justice. Id. at 73, 75.
There is little discussion of the socially-significant conflict between liberty and equality in
EMPIRE, perhaps to minimize the messy compromises necessary where conflicting rights are
taken too seriously; the reader is left to infer that (liberty) rights sometimes stop redistribution
(justice, defined as equality of resources). But the liberty/equality conflict is treated as a political problem in PRINCIPLE. Liberals value equality more, and conservatives value liberty.
PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 189. The suggestion is that this conflict over cardinal principles
must be resolved politically rather than by law-as-integrity, resolved in terms of how many
legislators and judges each side can muster. Dworkin does say that justice requires "some"
protection of the successful and "some" sovereignty over personal possessions, id. at 200, but
how much? At times, Dworkin seems to argue that the Equal Protection clause can, and
should more often be, a canon of redistribution, subject to the constraints of other rights. See
id. at 310-11.
24. Much in the values Dworkin espouses can plausibly be termed "mediumistic" because they represent the conventional wisdom of Anglo-American lawyers that is based on
training, convenience, satisfaction with tested results, etc. The very categories Dworkin uses
blithely, because he cannot re-invent all of law in one book, are based on conventions about
what, e.g., counts as a "tort." See S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 204-10 (1985); Alexander, Conventionalism, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 216
(1967); EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 114-15, 251; supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
Compared to conventionalism, integrity may thus be a somewhat similar and a somewhat
better account of our law. There will be disagreement about conventions, EMPIRE, at 122, and
about values of integrity too. The absence of an important convention means the loss of a
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ters differently. " This can be seen in his pragmatic, somewhat ethnocentric
New York Review of Books discussion of recent legal events in Argentina.2 6
connection between law and fair warning. Id. at 141-42. But such a connection is tenuous or
even absent when a judge makes new law by applying canons of integrity. Wise adjudication
always requires the "right" balance between predictability and flexibility, yet integrity is said
to constrain judges more than does conventionalism or pragmatism. Id. at 147, 261. But see id.
at 371; supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; infra notes 52, 54-55 and accompanying
text.
Something like Dworkin's principle of justice (equality of resources) can be made more
specific, to decide cases, in an almost infinite number of ways. Those specifics which get accepted become conventions of a "'selective subjectivism:" matters of legal technology, the range
of viable political and personal preferences, accidents of circumstance, etc. See Alexander,
supra note 22, at 217-19 (quoting A.S. Eddington at 217). The specifics become conventional
symbols of justice: "A is a sign of B because human beings have made it so," not because there
is a natural relationship in which, e.g., clouds are a sign of rain. HOSPERS, supra note 10, at
48.
See supra note 4 on the relationship between Dworkin's ideas and theories of natural law.
In EMPIRE, Dworkin seems to conflate a dichotomy much beloved by positivists, between the
law as it is and as it ought to be: If Hercules said plaintiff "has no legal right to win but has a
moral right that he proposes to honor, he would be misstating his [integrity-informed] view of
the matter." EMPIRE, supra note 1,at 262. The community would be outraged if Hercules
chose other than the best, from the standpoint of political morality. Id. at 263. This suggests
that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of what law ought to be, a proposition favoring
natural lawyers that positivists could not accept. Legal positivists may be declining in numbers, but positivism has received a powerful shot in the arm from economists pondering law.
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
Like pragmatism, integrity is reluctant to accept or reject whole chunks of doctrine. Both
theories seek to respond to social needs and to reflect a continuity between law and political
culture. They both recognize a plurality of a priori principles and categories, pigeonholes
where judges must often fit their decisions so as to conform to public opinion and to avoid
uprooting large areas of the law. Pragmatic judges and their law-as-integrity brethren must
sometimes choose between conflicting principles, where the scope of past decisions is unclear
and controversial. Historical consistency is not valued for its own sake, and all judges must go
on to win public support for good decisions. This gives a futuristic orientation to legal pragmatism and to law-as-integrity, a willingness to trade some predictability to gain the flexibility
needed to attain reformist or Progressive goals. Both theories recognize the evolutionary character of interpretations of principles and categories, and the evolutionary legal system that
results. See Beardsley, supra note 10, at 30-31; Thayer, Pragmatism, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 430, 435 (1967) (discussing the ideas of C.I. Lewis ); EMPIRE, at 95, 148-49, 153,
158-59, 163, 252.
Dworkin does admit that integrity represents a going beyond elements of conventionalism
and pragmatism. Id. at 95-96. He may properly criticize an "activist" judge for pursuing a
"virulent form of legal pragmatism .. " Id. at 378. But a judge pursuing integrity would
also have to be fairly activist in order to reform the legal system to the point where it plausibly
resembles the ideal Dworkin describes. There is even some of the instrumental, predictive quality in integrity that he associates with legal realism. See id. at 36. But Dworkin is not nearly
so skeptical as the realists. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. This leads him to denigrate the Critical Legal Studies "School" (the successor to legal realism) while seeking to coopt it. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
25. PRINCIPLE, supra note I, at 173.
26. Dworkin, Report from Hell, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 17, 1986, at 11.
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It is clear, however, that there is little of the positivist or skeptic about
Dworkin. This is bound to limit his appeal to those "barbarians" he courts
as such: the skeptical advocates of Critical Legal Studies (conventionally
termed Crits), and the positivist, often skeptical proponents of an economic
approach to law.
STRATEGY

For jurisprudes, economists and Crits are barbarians because they do
not automatically adopt the Empire's methods and culture. These rebels
skeptically question the reliability of jurisprudential truths, with no fear of
putting their, or law's, salvation at risk. This is fatal to a comprehensive
system like Dworkin's; as in theology or the sociology of a consensus, the
rest of a harmonious system must be accepted on faith while each of its
elements is "proved" correct, one at a time. With bellicose langauge and
rather overdrawn analyses, economists like Richard Posner and Crits like
Duncan Kennedy try to provoke legal philosophers into abandoning their
citadel and starting afresh from different first principles. Debates grow inefficient, generating more heat than light, when the jurisprudes reply in kind.
Dworkin puts it politely: "Incredibly, our jurisprudence has no plausible
theory of theoretical disagreement in law," of how disagreement is possible
Although an Argentinean commission report finds "ultimate brutality and absolute caprice" by
the previous military regime, id. at 12, Dworkin approves a pragmatic rather than a principled
solution: "Argentina needed to bury its past as well as condemn it, and many citizens felt that
years of trials would undermine the fresh sense of community .

. .

. which would be unwise in

a nation where military coups have become almost a ritual." Id. at 14. This makes sense
because there are degrees of guilt in crimes against humanity, because the Argentinean polity
and economy are fragile, and because it is "desperately important" to Latin America that the
Alfonsin Government succeed. Id. at 15-16.
Argentina "is one of the few governments in the region firmly committed to constitutional
democracy in our own sense, one of the few we can respect unreservedly." Id. at 16. Fine, but
do we "respect" Argentina by bending our own principles, especially when some Argentineans,
objecting to too few and modest punishments imposed too slowly, seem to echo our principles?
Dworkin may believe that this is the best we can expect from a country which is "not like us."
LAW's EMPIRE, after all, defends "an interpretation of our own political culture, not an abstract and timeless political morality.
EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 216; see infra note 58
and accompanying text.
Dworkin discusses one "principle" which seeks to circumvent Nuremberg-style problems:
government can be held accountable under law, without ex post facto changes in Argentina's
criminal law or procedure. Thus, the defense of superior orders remains available to lowerranking soldiers in some circumstances, and military courts can, if they choose, oust the jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel. Report from Hell, at 14, 16. But Dworkin
ignores an evolving but fairly definite international law of human rights, which is not ex post
facto the events in Argentina and which could be applied by its civilian courts. The events
Dworkin describes could indeed be regarded as a missed opportunity to take a step on the long
road to an international community of principle, the kind of community Dworkin seeks for
Britain and the United States. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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and what it is about.17 The "theory" Dworkin proceeds to create is certainly
as "plausible" as a theory about theory can be, but he begs the question of
whether this meta-theory should come from a "jurisprudence" rejected by a
significant and apparently growing number of the debaters. At stake is
nothing less than: whose Empire is it anyway, and who then are the
barbarians?
Dworkin's treatment of skepticism offers too few incentives for the
skeptics to join in his enterprise. He does admit that Anglo-American lawyers are skeptical about the possibility of right answers. But some other
theorists would add their skepticism about the relevance of some or many of
the questions in legal philosophy, questions like those Dworkin says judges
and legislators should and actually do ask. The right answer can be located,
economists like Posner would argue, but not through the medium of jurisprudence. Attacking an "internal" (to jurisprudence) skepticism with vigor,
Dworkin seems to underestimate the extent to which jurisprudential values
(e.g., justice, fairness, and due process) and/or principles conflict. He asserts that a "schizophrenia" of unstructured and disconnected doctrines the entropy leading to legal chaos stressed by some advocates of Critical
Legal Studies (Crits) and by some legal realists before them - will never
prevail.2 8 We may wish to believe, and thus be comforted, but we would do
well to demand the rigorous proof of this matter that Dworkin has not yet
supplied. Past and present experience offers little hope for judicial decisions
of so consistent an excellence that pockets of legal incoherence will not be
left to grow like cancers in our body politic.
The Crits' aesthetic principles, if they can be called that, have works of
art created out of communitarian visions (perhaps a mural spontaneously
drawn on a ghetto building), created by an indeterminate process (a more
randomized Jackson Pollock), or created by the fiat of a particular critical
community (presumably the Crits' deconstructionists as well as, e.g., the
American Bar Association's conventionalists). Rights then become either
less than they seem to Dworkin, or more. For example, some rights may
27. EMPIRE, at 6, 11. The theory of disagreement concerns what is the best that law can
be. See id. at 160. Economists might accept this, while Crits might see a need to account for
how bad law is and can be. For some Crits, this is a precondition to making law better - a
proposition Dworkin rejects. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
28. EMPIRE, supra note I, at 407; PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 3, 175. See Popkin, Skepticism, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 449, 457 (1967); id. at 458 (most thinkers today are
covertly skeptical "about the possibility of attaining knowledge concerning reality"); EMPIRE,
at 83, 153, 271-72; supra note 13. Dworkin makes some telling points, however. Skeptics who
nevertheless believe slavery to be wrong are just playing a game which they assume can be
distinguished from the real world; the supposed absence of an "objectivity" makes no difference to the result they would reach, based on their belief. On one account, skepticism is selfdefeating because the skeptic must adopt a moral point of view to criticize morality. PRINCIPLE, supra note I, at 173-75. See id. at 174.
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gain importance because they illustrate the workings of altruism or of the
economic substructure. 2 The Crits' aesthetic principles differ from Dworkin's chiefly in that they disparage his mediumistic values, as self-imposed
limitations drummed into students at art and law schools. Dworkin seeks to
co-opt some Crits by finding them committed to law-as-integrity, and he
makes strategic concessions to all Crits. He claims to share with the Crits
the desire to demystify law, perhaps helping to create a new legal mystique
in the process. He values Crit demonstrations of the need consciously to
maintain a legal coherence, and agrees with their stress on political convictions, ideology, and power as determinants of legal outcomes.30
The most significant, though far from total, concession Law's Empire
makes to the Crits is Dworkin's new concept of the "community of principle." To fulfill the promise of law-as-integrity, everyone in this community,
not just judges and legislators, must regularly reflect on the consequences of
their commitments to principle. Crits are presumably pleased when Dworkin traces his notion of community back to the French Revolution concept
of fraternity, but he does not go on to demonstrate fully how something like
Rousseau's "general will" emerges from the collectivity. Community membership is seen by Dworkin to "attract" obligations, just like family, scholarly, and neighborly relations do. An active commitment to an equal concern for all people supposedly breeds, even while people remain divided in
interest and over attitudes toward political morality and wisdom.31 With a
certain amount of sleight-of-hand from Dworkin, egalitarianism becomes
somewhat more consistent with the individualistic rights through which a
2
self-interest is asserted.3
Dworkin's seems the kind of organic community reflected in glorifications of the Volk by some nineteenth (and, alas, twentieth) century
Germans, and reflected by those Crits apparently bemused by the commune
movement of the late '60s and early '70s. They all see the community as a
happy family, where occasional quarrels among rough equals do not weaken
the bonds of communal authenticity. Assuming that an unrealistically high
29. See Beardsley, supra note 10, at 32; Clark, supra note 1, at 52, 54; EMPIRE, supra
note 1, at 272-73, 408. But see also PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 150.
30. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 272-75, 408. See id. at 275.
31. Id. at 1, 96-97, 188, 196, 198-200, 411, 413. Dworkin distinguishes three types of

community. The community of circumstance is based on accidents of history and geography;
agreements are kept only so long as they are mutually advantageous. In the rulebook community, rules generate obligations on the basis of negotiated compromises rather than a commitment to principle. The community of principle takes a more generous and comprehensive view
of shared understandings; outcomes may be unjust but at least checkerboard solutions and
unprincipled compromises are condemned. Id. at 209-14. See infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
32. See EMPIRE, supra note 1,at 299-300, 408 (arguably a less elegant theory of justice
than Rawls').
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degree of consensus will emerge, they all see that the community can be a
single moral agent acting out a single, coherent set of principles. This feat
is accomplished through a personification of the community which, in
Dworkin's hands, takes a form few Crits could accept: an analogy to the
corporation-as-a-person. For Dworkin, corporate and community responsibilities are akin to a sense of personal responsibility, and the responsibilities
are felt to be binding even by those who are not at fault or even in control.3 3
Recent books by Bellah and Walzer" demonstrate how difficult it would be
to achieve a community of principle. Ours is not a society simple enough to
be joined by the single bond of principle, with a potent recent history to
unite us and few conflicting commitments to divide us. We are indoctrinated with individuality to the point where it is hard to find even the language to express a commitment to community. "Lifestyle enclaves" serve as
seductive substitutes for community and forestall its formation. The alienation and anomie some sociologists observe in some of us make it unlikely
that community moral guidance will have the effects Dworkin desires.
Having recognized a "personification mistake" by economists, 35 Dworkin should be more sensitive to the risks of making a similar mistake. Like
Rousseau, he sometimes seems to confuse the community with the state.
Roscoe Pound, some Crits, and some economists effectively demonstrate
that the community and the state can have very different and conflicting
interests. The only response Dworkin makes is that community integrity
serves as an (apparently rather weak) "constraint" on actions by what can
33. See id. at 166-70. For example, we apply facsimiles of personal responsibility to a
corporation in a products liability case, because no single employee has full control over manufacture. Id. at 170 (a process by which individual responsibility is often circumvented, however). Likewise, "white Americans who inherited nothing from slaveholders feel an indeterminate responsibility to blacks who never wore chains." Id. at 172 (a statement which seemingly
cannot be true of all "white Americans"). This is the political integrity of the community
personified, since it otherwise seems incompatible with principles of not blaming those who
were not unjustly enriched or who had no control over the perpetrators. Id. One problem with
analogizing the community of principle and the concept of the corporation is that this concept
is often little more than a legal fiction; it is invoked so that our legal system can somehow deal
with a collectivity and still retain an intense individualism inconsistent with the sense of community Dworkin pursues. The personification of the corporation occasionally enables and perhaps encourages a collectivity to act in the unprincipled fashion Dworkin presumably deplores:
e.g., pursuing profit maximization or managerial welfare, to the exclusion of other values.
Dworkin and some Crits arguably underestimate the difficulties in building a sense of
community, just as some economists and political scientists exaggerate the difficulties under
theories of an interest group pluralism. See infra notes 45, 48-49 and accompanying text.
How, for example, can the many, cross-cutting sub-communities, which James Madison described in Federalist No. 51 as controlling the "vice of faction," be brought together?
34. See R. BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART 7-8, 19, 333, 335, passim (1985); M.
WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION (1985); Abrahms, Kitsch and Community, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 941 (1986).
35. PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 240, 249.
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be a strong and determined state. Dworkin's community may be conscious
of its identity, but it is difficult to see how it, as opposed to the state, can be
held responsible for acts and omissions - including failures to contrain the
state. 6
Dworkin does not go the whole communitarian hog with the Crits for
whom, apparently, "the only good is the communal good" and law must be
purified of the "individual rights that corrupt the community's
sense. . . . ,,3 He finds in Crit analysis a defective account of liberalism hardly a surprise since few Crits claim to be liberals. Dworkin flatly opposes the Crit conclusions that legal culture is incoherent and that it can be
grasped only through what he calls "the infertile metric of contradiction." 8
This remark can perhaps be allowed to pass with the observation that analysts have as much trouble applying the Hegelian dialectic on alien American soil as Dworkin would have in criticizing their results. Criticizing the
Crits, Dworkin has not, as Holmes recommends, entered into their theory
with a hypothetical sympathy. Dworkin would then have to show that Crit
demonstrations of law at its worst are of no value, that the avenues to significant legal change are in fact open, and that Crit mystifications and political goals are necessarily worse than the old ones. Absent such proofs,
Crits can thumb their noses and plausibly argue that Dworkin's analyses
and values are not necessarily the best account to be given of an authentic
existence under law.' His theory may reflect, rather, the unattractive subconscious desires and improper bases for action that some Crits enumerate,
the systematic errors fostered by a political and economic system benefitting from the errors.
40
Dworkin takes "THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION" of law

36. See Danto, Persons, 6

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 110,

I11

(1967) (citing

Kant); EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 166, 190, 401; id. at 188 (discussed infra note 55). For
Dworkin, government is "the community personified," EMPIRE at 296: i.e., the rather confusing
and manipulable personification of a personification. Government thus has the duty, the pervasive public responsibility, to take the interests of all within the territory equally into account.
Id. But see infra note 45, and accompanying text (the contrary view, from law and
economics).

37.

EMPIRE,

supra note 1, at 408.

38. Id. at 272, 275. See id. at 274: Crits claim that constitutional and main doctrinal
lines can only be justified as liberal views of personality and community. Perhaps, but Crit
theories are much less individualistic than those incorporated by Dworkin.
39. See Beardsley, supra note 10, at 33. But see also PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 172.
40. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 276. Dworkin cannot purport to encompass all of law and
economics within a discussion of the law of accidents, but he does give a useful discussion of
the Coase Theorem and complexities arising under it. See id. at 276-85. For Dworkin, economics "argues that common law judges, at least, have on the whole decided hard cases to maximize social wealth, and that they ought to decide such cases in that way." PRINCIPLE, supra
note 1, at 237. Their argument turns on an easily misunderstood wealth maximization, which
cannot be equated with Pareto efficiency and which equates value with the willingness and
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more seriously than he does Critical Legal Studies. He enters into economic
theory more fully and grants it more concessions. The economist, co-opted
as "[a]nother philosopher of our law," sees law as "more thoroughly utilitarian . ..more consistently and accurately devoted to maximizing the un-

critical satisfaction of people's overall preferences."" Dworkin's argument
seems one of: I am a utilitarian too, but not by as much as the economist.
This admission must hurt, since Dworkin's aesthetics of integrity are
designed to counteract crass theories like neoclassical economics, where the
only concern is with the utility of an art-object - its financial value and its
instrumental role in maximizing the wealth of society. Nevertheless, Law's
Empire argues that, like the Crits, economists respect and use integrity
while constructing chain novels of epic dimensions.4 2 This may be so or it
may reflect a co-opting of rebels against Law's Empire. Crits and economists seem to be using very different texts - perhaps Jack London's and
Horatio Alger's or Theodore Dreiser's respectively - under the influence of
critics so very different in approach that there is no joining of issues, either
between themselves or with Dworkin.
Dworkin makes many concessions to economists,' the crucial one beability to pay. Id.
41. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 408 (emphasis supplied). At one level, Dworkin says little
more than that law and economics, as he defines it, does not necessarily amount to a philosophical utilitarianism, as he defines it. Many economists would agree or dismiss the matter as
irrelevant. But Dworkin makes some telling points which suggest that it is still fair to term law
and economics a utilitarianism in another guise. E.g., sadistic racial bigots might be so numerous that torturing a black person would increase overall happiness. Id. at 290-91. This is the
kind of issue, like slavery, sex discrimination, etc., with which law and economics has trouble
coping. See id. at 294: Personal autonomy would collapse if a market-simulating duty exists.
This duty never sleeps, and I could perform only those activities for which I would and could
outbid others. Id.
42. Id. at 408-09. See HOSPERS, supra note 10, at 36.
43. E.g., integrity promotes efficiency. When people accept governance by standards as
well as rules, the standards can be expanded or contracted to deal efficiently with new circumstances, and to allow people to experiment to reach the best result. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at
144, 188. The explicit goals of integrity - justice, fairness, and due process - are at one
juncture stated to be in addition to creating wealth. Id. at 243. But this leaves open the question of how courts are to balance wealth against the explicit goals more fully elaborated by
Dworkin. Due process is defined as a judicial balance struck between accuracy and efficiency.
Id. at 166-67. Others might define efficiency as a watering down of due process protections.
The connection between law and fair warning is maintained, not necessarily because surprise is
unfair but because it is inefficient - it imposes unnecessary risks. Id. at 141-42. We take
relative costs into account when making moral decisions about, for example, whether or not to
run sparking locomotives through dry grain fields. Id. at 302-03. If compromise is impossible,
"we must act as if the concrete rights we cannot both exercise had not yet been distributed
between us, and we must distribute these ourselves as best we can .. " Id. at 303. This is
exactly what many economists would advocate, but on the basis of a willingness and ability to
pay for rights rather than Dworkin's standard: "in the way equality of resources commends."
Id. See also id. at 253 (limited concessions to economics in drawing the distinction between
nuisance and negligence); id. at 302 (quoted infra text accompanying note 45); PRINCIPLE,
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ing his admission against interest that economics passes integrity's threshold test of a good "fit" between theoretical principles and actual outcomes.
He goes on to argue that economics does not justify the legal process as
well as integrity does, but many economists would, as positivists, dispute the
relevance of such a justification. For them, there is simply no need to plug
Dworkin's moral duty into economics: advancing the good of the community by avoiding injury to others or compensating them when injury occurs."" A self-interested rationality, operating through markets, serves as an
adequate constraint on behavior for many economists, and their principles
of efficiency and wealth maximization create a consistency of result which
Dworkin cannot hope to match. His explicit pursuit of justice, fairness, and
due process is thus both unnecessary and inefficient.
Many economists' notions of community are as skeptical as their marketplace notions are naive. To generalize, their community is one of negotiated compromises among antagonistic interests. Bargains are kept only as
long as the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. Values and rights are
relative and subjective because they are allocated in a "porkbarrel" fashion
within a community which is no greater than the sum of its interest-group
parts. This is the antithesis of Dworkin's community of principle, and he
argues forcefully against the economists' community but is unable to damage it much. Most accounts of legislative and judicial processes show that
little effort is consistently made to put everyone in the fair and just position
Dworkin espouses. Economists can plausibly argue that, contra Dworkin, it
is all but impossible for legislators to act for the good of the entire community and on the basis of a scheme of political morality. Judges often implement the interest-group bargains we call legislation, rather than the values Dworkin associates with the integrity of a community of principle.45
We can expect many economists to object strongly to Dworkin's notion
that equality should prevail in the distribution of resources. Anticipating
their criticism, Dworkin rejects the rival wealth-maximizing distribution of
resources he attributes to economists because it forces private choice to
compete with public responsibility. Positivist economists would presumably
respond that a public responsibility is identical to a private choice, consupra note 1, at 194 (discussed infra note 46).
44. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 284-86.
45. See Landes and Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. AND EcON. 875 (1975); Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. AND
ECON. 617 (1975); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. AND
EcON. 211 (1976); PRINCIPLE, supra note I, at 249 (economists' personification of the community silly and malign); supra note 31. But see also EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 209-10, 243-44,
344. If the theory of interest-group pluralism is plausible - and it has certainly convinced
many American political scientists as well as economists - Dworkin cannot maintain that, for
example, certain kinds of legislative history are especially good evidence of "public opinion."
But see id. at 42.
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strained by market forces, and no competition arises between the two. But

Dworkin is right to insist on some demarcation of private and pubic
spheres, if for no other reason than this offers another way of considering
the liberty/equality dilemma."
He asks: Why is the wealthier society "better," when wealth is but one
component of a social value that includes happiness, utility, and fairness in

distribution? 47 But if wealth doesn't matter much, why do so many pursue

46. Id. at 297-98; supra note 23 and accompanying text. An egalitarian distribution
requires that the costs of satisfying one's preferences be as close as possible to the costs of
satisfying another's. This is a market-like efficiency solution. PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 194.
Many economists would disagree, reasoning that the "free" market, rather than one constrained by Dworkin's principle, determines efficient solutions. An equality in the cost of, e.g.,
preference-satisfying opera and rock concert tickets will occur only by accident. Dworkin argues that the "market produces both the required and the forbidden equalities," id. at 196, a
normative judgment most positivist economists could not accept. Dworkin acknowledges this
by noting that the market represents equality of opportunity for conservatives, an equality
which will be denied if an equality of result is sought. Id. at 201. Many economists would also
reject as contrary to wealth maximization the special allowances Dworkin makes in his distributive scheme for an inequality of talents, for the effects of an ancestor's skill or luck in generating wealth, and for the needs of the handicapped. Id. at 195.
Dworkin would require people to treat others as equals, not when using what the system
assigns them but when deciding what the system assigns them. The latter issue raises the
question of what the system should be taken to be, and thus calls forth a public responsibility.
EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 302. This is impossibly altruistic for many positivist economists, for
whom self-interested behavior in markets best determines assignments (distributions). See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. They might also deny the relevance of Dworkin's
distinction: the value and even the nature of resources can only be determined by using them,
by thus establishing their opportunity costs. Such economists would not adopt Dworkin's
equality in the distribution of resources because it would not maximize social wealth.
It is also possible that applications of Dworkin's principles to generate an equality of
resources will result in empty or minimal rights. After each individual receives her justlyearned share, there may be too little left over for redistribution - a potential problem for
Rawls' theory of justice as well. Dworkin would use rights to trump wealth maximization so as
to, for example, secure the independence of each against the others' prejudices and dislikes. If
these are allowed to influence market transactions, the results become less sensitive to the
"true cost" of choices: my child's life depends on a noisy ambulance that others, annoyed by

the noise, will pay more than all I have to eliminate.

EMPIRE,

at 307. See

PRINCIPLE,

supra

note 1, at 253 (discussed infra note 49). (This example assumes that the costs of annoyance
would not be voluntarily absorbed by the sufferers, out of an altruistic regard for those in
peril.).
Economists might disagree with Dworkin's conclusion, finding the noisy ambulance to be
wealth maximizing: the benefits of the child's life, plus the benefits of avoiding accidents between the ambulance and other motorists (their insurance companies would "bribe" the ambulance or the legislature to require use of the siren), outweigh the costs of annoyance. Further,
having abandoned marketplace measurements of cost, Dworkin would find it difficult to
demonstrate what the "true cost" is. In any event, individuals often vote for ambulances in a
legislative "market" because the costs of noisy ambulances are outweighed by the benefits of
their use, even after the benefits are discounted in each individual's mind by the probability of
having to use the ambulance and being unable to then bribe his way into it.
47. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 288; PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 240. See id. at 242, 245-
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it so avidly, regardless of happiness, fairness, and a low probability of success? Perhaps Americans (at least) are pursuing a culturally-induced goal
which serves to deny the possibility of a community of principle, a wealth
goal of which economics theory is an effect as well as a cause. Once again,
many economists would deny the relevance of Dworkin's normative judgments about better and worse societies, and see them as attempts to return
economics to the inferior (unscientific) status of a moral philosophy. It is
not the positivist economists' responsibility to inculcate virtue. Despite his
desire to make war against positivism, Dworkin fails to account for the virulence of an economics positivism.
He nevertheless makes some arguments which tell against the economists' expansionist legal enterprise. An analysis which assumes the adequacy of the scheme already in place is "a grotesquely circular and feeble
weapon" for pursuing the public interest."8 Dworkin seems to recognize that
if we do not believe in the existence of something called the public interest,
we may never look for it and attempt to express it; finding the economists'
interest-group pluralism plausible, we may come to accept their theory as
the only possible means of governance and thereby prove economists correct
by default. Intuitively at least, government must be something more than
the alternative supplier of household inputs that some economists make it
out to be.
If a democratic society entails a democratic economy, Dworkin attempts to describe what such an economy would look like under his canons
of justice and fairness. The line must obviously be drawn somewhere, between an aggressive enforcement of rights and an amoral wealth maximization that would ignore or relegate rights to the status of interest-group
preferences. Dworkin probably goes too far in treating rights as trump
cards against marketplace results, but some economists go much too far in
having the market inevitably trump and even define rights. A mid-point, an
appropriately "mixed" economy, must be found between an economist's
privatizing of all life and Dworkin's turning of life's responsibilities into
something rather more public (in a community of principle) than many
46. Integrity prefers a consistency of principle over a consistency of policy. See supra note 15.
Economists might find this notion strange and even incomprehensible. Dworkin considers the
economists' favorite policy in the area of torts - choose the principle for accident compensation that minimizes community accident costs - and concludes that it is "far from obvious"
that economists are stating any principle of justice here. Id. at 242; see also id. at 282. Any
principle could apparently override this mere policy.
48. Id. at 310. See id. at 323, 328-29. Dworkin argues that positivism cannot cope with
"hard" cases, PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 147, but many economists would disagree concerning an economics positivism. It seems that economic analysis gives rise to "hard" cases that are
different from Dworkin's, situations where it is unclear which is the efficient or wealth maximizing result.
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Americans would tolerate.49
Having held out against the economists with some success, Dworkin
nearly gives the game away by noting that choices among legal rules will be
directed "to market simulation in most ordinary cases" where rights compete.50 This leaves the door open for efficiency and wealth maximization
(principles of "market simulation") to serve as tie-breakers in the situations
- which are much more common than Dworkin recognizes or admits where rights, principles and/or values conflict. The door remaining open,
certain economists will rush in headlong. They can, like Dworkin, assert a
consensus without proving its existence. Their consensus (over the pursuit of
wealth and efficiency) is corroborated fairly convincingly by a public abhorrence of policies perceived as welfare programs and of a broadly-defined
waste in government. Economists can argue that such a consensus will prevail unless and until Dworkin or others demonstrate a consensus to do
something different."1 Like those of the Crits, many economists' arguments
serve to increase substantially Dworkin's burden of proof: showing the actual or potential existence of a community of principle committed to the
values of integrity.
THE TACTICS OF STRATEGY

Many would want their legal system to display integrity. We would
agree with some or many of the meta-virtues Dworkin describes, yet dispute
the results in concrete cases about abortion, school prayer, and even the
parol evidence rule. A consensus over principles, which Dworkin states but
does not prove, combined with a dissensus over results, which he admits,
would achieve little more than to shift the topics for discursive disagreement.5 2 If a reader, a Crit or an economist for example, leaves the "argu49. See PRINCIPLE, supra note I, at 196-97, 252. Dworkin does, however, ignore the
possibility that different types of rights would be appropriate for different facets of a democracy's economic system: for marketplace decisions, a Keynesian economic stabilization (under,
e.g., the Full Employment Act of 1946), or an industrial policy or selective centralized planning. He offers an example challenging to economics: if A is B's slave, A cannot afford to buy
this right from B. A might borrow the money, but this would presumably lead to an equally
distasteful life as "the slave of the First National Bank (of Chicago, of course)." Id. at 253-54.
If A were not B's slave, B would not be able to buy this right from A. Id. at 253. This and
other analyses lead Dworkin to the plausible conclusion that, in economics, "we cannot specify
an initial assignment of rights unless we answer questions that cannot be answered unless an
initial assignment of rights is specified." Id. at 253.
50. EMPIRE, supra note 1,at 302.
51. See Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1015 (1978); Posner, Some Uses and Misuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 281 (1979). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52. See EMPIRE, at 73, 75, 164-68, 178-79; supra notes 16-18, 23 and accompanying
text. Not very long ago, liberalism was a consensus political theory in Britain and America, at
least among political philosophers. There was consensus over improving the chances of each to
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ment early, at some crucial abstract stage, then I [Dworkin] have largely
failed for him. If he leaves it late, in some manner of relative detail, then I
have largely succeeded. I have failed entirely, however, if he never leaves
my argument at all." ' This is fine stuff, a charming liberal disarming his
critics. His tactic is to hypothesize critics and then describe them as more
or less important. These critics can come to resemble straw men, especially
when the reader thinks of more and better criticisms than Dworkin invents.
It is not that he is being unfair; his approach merely reflects the difficulty of
anticipating criticisms based in other systems when you are deep within
your own.5

Dworkin pursues consensus so avidly and attacks skepticism so strenuously because he feels the need to legitimate his vision of the legal system.
Like others who worry over retaining the power of unelected judges in a
democratic society, Dworkin tries to augment the authority of contentious
decisions and, ultimately, of all principled exercises of state coercion. His
argument is that those who take the benefits of political organization improvements in their welfare, judged in some politically-neutral way must take the burdens as well. 5 5 Some economists and Crits would deny the
live the life he/she thought best, and over decreasing the inequality of resources available for
this purpose. But some now think this too generous and expensive a precept, while others find
it too divisive and mean-spirited. PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 4.
53. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 413.
54. see id. at 36-37, 263-64; See also id. at 263, quoted supra note 4; id. at 264-65,
quoted supra note 10. For example, having in effect invented integrity a hundred pages earlier,
Dworkin finds that: "No aspect of law as integrity has been so misunderstood as its refusal to
accept the popular view that there are no uniquely-right answers in hard cases at law." Id. at
266.
Dworkin does usefully pursue the liberal technique of accounting for his convictions in
good faith, standing ready to abandon them when better ones come along. PRINCIPLE, supra
note 1, at 172. Yet, in his crusade against skepticism, there is a great deal of flexibility within
his elaborately-defined and -analyzed system, but very little flexibility with regard to considerations outside its ambit.
55. See EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 37, 117, 153, 159, 188, 190-91, 195; PRINCIPLE, supra
note 1, at 199. Despite its being a unitary concept de jure, sovereignty comes in many shapes
and shades de facto. Dworkin ignores this, despite his sensitivity to "political practices" at
other junctures. He simply asserts: There must be a consensus that legal institutions form a
system. EMPIRE, at 91. Here, Dworkin may well be arguing against Crits and economists,
whose powerful ideological claims dispute the legitimacy of current political attempts to define
concepts such as justice and fairness. They would thus oppose his central argument here: integrity creates a special form of community, promoting its moral authority to a monopoly of
coercion by protecting against partiality, deceit, and other forms of corruption. Id. at 188. But
see supra note 36 and accompanying text; Greve, Book Review, 85 THE PUB. INTEREST, 131
(Fall 1986) which states:
[In EMPIRE], Dworkin goes on at length about the parallels between literary and
judicial interpretation, but it never occurs to him that coercion and authority might make
a crucial difference.
. . . Dworkin's failure to come to grips with authority explains why he does not
realize that "law as integrity" is altogether incompatible with "true community." Hercu-
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possibility of a neutral political evaluation, but Dworkin's formulation could
prove a salutory lesson for the many people who do cost-benefit calculations
about particular court decisions and governmental programs. The problem
is that people may not trouble to evaluate the system as a whole, or they
may, in an unprincipled fashion, accept the benefits and reject the burdens
by, for example, "evading" or "avoiding" taxes. Even worse for Dworkin,
some people basically accept the system while working so hard against parts
of it - Vietnam, abortion, etc. - in so principled a fashion as to delegitimate the process as a whole.
Clearly, then, Law's Empire must make the legal system add up so
well and function so tightly that people cannot accept the bits they like and
reject the rest. But as noted earlier," Dworkin's justice, fairness, and due
process values do not add up particularly well. The "fit" of these components of integrity is apparently to be improved under the most abstract,
fundamental, and uncontroversial part of law. This is the concept "that
force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends
in view . ..except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is
justified. '5 7 In the end, Dworkin makes little use of this assertion. It merits
further elaboration in relation to the values of integrity.58
Dworkin prefers, rather, to spend the last few pages of Law's Empire
describing "law beyond law," how "law works itself pure" through applications of integrity. A "pure" integrity abstracts what it requires from the
constraints of fairness and due process; justice then becomes "what the
community personified, abstracting from institutional responsibilities,"
lean decisions [see supra note 13], imposed by brute judicial force, tend to do very little
in the way of promoting a fraternal atmosphere.
[In the liberal tradition, officials are constrained by "highly formal" rules.] When
rules are replaced with a muddle of [Dworkin's] "values," official coercion is more readily exercised. Law becomes unpredictable ...
56. See -supranotes 16-18, 22-23 and accompanying text.
57. EMPIRE, at 93. See id. at 93-96. This concept is to be distinguished from the conceptions of law that refine it: conventionalism, pragmatism, and integrity. Id. at 94. "Concept" is
one of the oldest terms in philosophy, remaining useful because of its ambiguity. Heath, Concept, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 177 (1967). A passkey through labyrinths of theory, a
"concept" is essentially a dummy expression or a variable assigned meaning by, and only ascertainable through, a theory. Id. at 177-78. This seems a fair comment on Dworkin's usage.
58. See EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 216: "1 am defending an interpretation of our own
political culture, not an abstract and timeless political morality." But this is exactly what the
"concept" sounds like. Dworkin is unwilling or unable to make much use of it while analyzing
"wicked" or "defective" legal systems. See id. at 107-08; supra note 26. The "concept" is
useful precisely because it exists at so abstract a level, above competing explanations of the
relation between law and community opinion. EMPIRE, at 97. But see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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ought to achieve. 59 With respect, this is the deus ex machina that makes
everything come out right in a theory of pure law, much as the Grundnorm
squares everything in Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law. 0 Argument at so
abstract and utopian a level has its advantages in terms of defining away
disputes. But paralyzing disagreements will reappear at the most inconvenient time: just when concrete "hard" cases are being decided, the time
when Dworkin claims to be the most helpful. Law's Empire thus ends on a
mystical note, the same way it begins: "law makes us what we are," the
"liegemen to its methods and ideals .. ."' Why don't we make law what
it is, as many of Dworkin's other arguments suggest, unless he feels the
need for an Imperial law which will turn barbarians into "liegemen"?
There are at least three fundamental and contradictory visions of what
the Empire should be. Each responds to the continuing decline of belief in
traditional authority, black letter law, and an arid doctrinalism. Each thus
seeks a more compelling theory and, except for Dworkin's, more effective
policy arguments. Economists see
an individualism which represents a world consisting of independent and self-sufficient persons, confidently drawing up and robustly pursuing their own life plans. . . .The [Crits'] . ..vision flows from a collectivism that views the world as made up
of interdependent and cooperating persons. Recognizing the vulnerability of individuals, it encourages greater solidarity and al59. EMPIRE, supra note I, at 400, 405-07. See id. at 400-07; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
60. See H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967). Perhaps the best formulation is
Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1130, 1139-42
(1965).
Dworkin's process of law working itself pure sounds rather dialectical and Hegelian: "The
Absolute Idea is pure thought thinking about pure thought." B. RUSSELL, Philosophy and
Politics, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 11,
20 (1976) (paraphrasing Hegel). But see also EMPIRE, supra
note 1,at 400; id. at 400-01 ("Law as integrity ... is the idea of law worked pure," subject
to the institutional constraints on judges). At this, their highest level of meta-theory, Dworkin's arguments may be too ratified and Germanic to appeal to many American lawyers.
Judges could presumably manipulate semantics, symbols, ideologies, and even institutions to
escape the strictures of law working itself pure - which is not a very satisfactory aesthetic
principle of law either. A work of art is said to be "pure" if it does not combine several arts or
media, it excludes content (it is non-representational), and it is not muddied or mixed with
nonaesthetic modes: historical reporting, propaganda, or straightforward moralizing. V. Aldrich, supra note 6, at 101. It is difficult to imagine so austere and pristine a legal theory, even
from Dworkin.
61. EMPIRE, supra note I, at vii. Our "most structured and revealing social institution,"
law commands even "when the lawbooks are silent or unclear or ambiguous.
" Id. at vii,
11. The Supreme Court is "the most dramatic witness for judicial power ... Id. at 2. Law
may even be fundamentally flawed, but "it is not a grotesque joke .. " Id. at 44. Although
some Crits would disagree, these statements are perhaps the central message of LAW's EMPIRE: the Imperial dimensions of law in what nevertheless remains a democratic society.
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truism. . . . Each vision represents only a partial and incomplete depiction of social life and its possibilities ....
These visions leave a great deal of room for a third, more complete vision

from Dworkin.
Economics or critical theory is not a license to run roughshod over the
Constitution and precedent. Doctrine obviously does not capture all of the
reality in law 3 but there are some objective legal values in it worth saving.
The question is whether Dworkin has identified them correctly and plotted

a safe and democratic course between anarchism and authoritarianism. His
flexible dogmatics, to be used to implement a moderate preference for
equality, are calculated to appeal to those of us who disdain the extremist
politics implied by the other visions. Moderate liberals and those moderate
conservatives who are appalled by some economists' conclusions may join

with Dworkin in his fight to reinstate the power of jurisprudence. But Crits
and economists are too smart to fight the battle on Dworkin's chosen
ground: "abstract political morality." This ground would give too great an

advantage to the philosopher-king. If this sounds an unfair characterization
of Dworkin, consider the striking similarities between the import of Dworkin's arguments and some of those in Plato's Republic. 65 Much in Dwor62. Hutchinson, Of Kings and Dirty Rascals: The Struggle for Democracy, 1985
QUEEN'S L.J. 273, 282, as quoted in EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 442, n.20 (discussing social
visions concerning accident compensation law). Hutchinson goes on to say that, "[wihichever
principle [anyone] opts for is simply his preference," id. - a laissez faire argument that arguably favors the economists and that may deny the possibility of a workable legal system.
Dworkin calls these visions "Law's Dreams," EMPIRE, at 407-10.
63. Clark, supra note I, at 53-54; Reidinger, supra note 1, at 65.
64. EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 408. See id. at 407: "The courts are the capitals of law's
empire and judges are its princes, but not its seers and prophets. It falls to philosophers . . . to
work out law's ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have."
65. Consider, for example, Plato, THE REPuBLIc 209-10 (F. Cornford trans. 1945) (Bk.
VI., 500-01) (source suggested by Ken Klein, supra note 2):
[H]ow will this artist set to work?
He will take society and human character as his canvas, and begin by scraping it
clean. That is no easy matter; but, as you know, unlike other reformers, he will not consent to take in hand either an individual or a state or to draft laws, until he is given a
clean surface to work on or has cleansed it himself.
Next, he will sketch in the outline of the constitution. Then, as the work goes on, he
will frequently refer to his model, the ideals of justice, goodness, temperance, and the
rest, and compare with them the copy of those qualities which he is trying to create in
human society. Combining the various elements of social life as a painter mixes his
colours, he will reproduce the complexion of true humanity, guided by that divine pattern
whose likeness Homer saw in the men he called godlike. He will rub out and paint in
again this or that feature, until he has produced, so far as may be, a type of human
character that heaven can approve.
Are we now making any impression on those assailants who .
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kin's philosphy seems to have many of the Platonic strengths and weaknesses, most notably the difficulty of imposing so much philosophizing upon
an unreflective democratic society.
Resistance by economists and Crits is no mere guerilla tactic; the redistribution of power that has already occurred in academe forces Dworkin
to fight on their chosen battlefields at least some of the time. This is not a
bad thing, except when battles merely replicate for law the academic wars
of "disciplines" that were frozen into "departments" when we took our
model of the university from nineteenth century Germany. In the mainstream of the liberalism that so influenced Britain and America, parts of
philosophy, history, economics, political science, and law were all facets of a
unified "political economy." Adam Smith, Bentham, Mill, and many others
derived their broad theories of justice from this political economy. An updating and a reintegration of its insights is both necessary and an appropriate burden to place on those who claim the title "liberal" by way of succession: Dworkin, many economists, and, if Dworkin is correct, some Crits. No
so furiously when we spoke in praise of the philosopher and proposed to give him control
of the state? Will they be calmer now that we have told them we mean an artist who will
use his skill in this way to design a constitution?
Despite statements like the one in EMPIRE, supra note 1, at Ill (quoted supra note 12), 1
would argue that this extract from Plato fairly indicates the enormity of the task Dworkin has
undertaken.
Similarities between Dworkin's aesthetics and that in THE REPUBLIC are further illustrated by this extract from Book V. (THE REPUBLIC, at 177-78; Bk. V., 472-73):
[W]hen we set out to discover the essential nature of justice and injustice and what
a perfectly just and a perfectly unjust man would be like, supposing them to exist, our
purpose was to use them as ideal patterns: we were to observe the degree of happiness or
unhappiness that each exhibited, and to draw the necessary inference that our own
destiny would be like that of the one we most resembled, We did not set out to show that
these ideals could in fact exist.
Then suppose a painter had drawn an ideally beautiful figure complete to the last
touch, would you think any the worse of him, if he could not show that a person as
beautiful as that could exist?
No, I should not.
Well, we have been constructing in discourse the pattern of an ideal state. Is our
theory any the worse, if we cannot prove it possible that a state so organized should be
actually founded?
That, then, is the truth of the matter. But if, for your satisfaction, I am to do my
best to show under what conditions our ideal would have the best chance of being realized, I must ask you once more to admit that the same principle applies here. Can theory
ever be fully realized in practice? Is it not in the nature of things that action should come
less close to truth than thought?
This extract in my view nicely characterizes Dworkin's idealistic, utopian (community of principle) approach, with all the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach done well. When
"someone has a belief or conviction it makes sense to ask for its pedigree," EMPIRE, supra note
1, at 426 n.27, yet Dworkin describes little of his pedigree. For example, there is no index
entry for Plato.
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sub-specialization in law can dominate, except on the merits of arguments
intelligible to the educated non-specialist.
The history of Progressivism and legal realism suggests that economists
and Crits will eventually be incorporated into the Establishment (represented here by Dworkin), as effective judges and law school deans who have
to defend decisions in ways acceptable to a broader audience." How, then,
will the articles of incorporation read? Key phrases will certainly be drawn
from Dworkin's draft, but we will be better off if the incorporation occurs
later rather than sooner. There is value in maintaining skepticisms external
to jurisprudence, rather than co-opted by it. The gadfly role of Crits and
economists forces jurisprudes to look to their laurels, rather than quibble
over their beloved finer points. Deep reflection may create constructive alternatives and sweep out an accumulation of attenuated subtleties, the better results that a jurisprudence not under attack could arguably never
attain.
For example, the gadflies can demonstrate that Dworkin has not answered three central questions as well as he might have hoped. What is the
content of individual rationality (and, for the Crits, irrationality), and what
are its implications for a group rationality? What, if anything, holds a community together, other than self-interest and. brute force? What, if anything, justifies interferences in the distribution of wealth, in a democracy?
Economics and much of Critical Legal Studies being strongly anti-statist, it
is not enough for Dworkin to assert that the state, perhaps confused by him
with the community, will promote a principled, consensus justice somehow.
It is not enough for him to disdain history and policies, simply because they
67
are thought inferior to principles.
Finally, it is not enough for the three different visions to tell us what
we should want (elitism), in a utopia where none of us live:68 perfect markets and fatally-flawed governments, a near-perfect altruism, or a community of principle. These utopian visions must inevitably be watered down
and compromised later in order to get adopted and otherwise to yield concrete results. A healthy dose of pragmatism should arguably be introduced
earlier, especially as this attitude is so deeply ingrained in twentieth century
America. In sum, my "interpretive" reading of Law's Empire is that it is
very, very good but not the very best it could and must be.

66. See Reidinger, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting a Crit, Robert Gordon): Critical Legal
Studies, "it seems to me, is a descendant of the critical trend in [legal] realism, and the Chicago School [of law and economics] has inherited the constructive aspect. They share a sense
that the institutions that were supposed to rescue us haven't worked out too well."
67. See supra note 14-17, 33-36 and accompanying text.
68. But see EMPIRE, at 409-10.
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